

NAK-78-295

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By <u>JK</u>	NARS, Date <u>7/13/75</u>

6 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

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Subject: Expert Observations on the Berlin Situation

1. Dr. Strauz-Nupe^s was in our office the other day and passed on his views on the current situation in Germany. He has just returned from a 3-month stay in Germany where he has been instructing at the University of Heidelberg.

2. Of course, I realize that Strauz-Nupe^s has very strong opinions on Europe, NATO, Germany, etc., but he carefully qualified his observations by saying that these did not reflect his opinions but, as honestly as he could make it, reflected his factual observations.

3. He senses that there is a rapid deterioration of the morale of our friends in high places in Germany. This is not a sensing of the attitude of the German public, but rather of Bundestag members, college professors and similar personnel of the governmental and intellectual elite. This tendency has become very marked in the last four weeks, i.e., mid-July to mid-August. These people are deeply disturbed. They believe that Berlin is lost, sooner or later, and feel that this gradual envelopment of Berlin will result in a reversal of public opinion in Germany against NATO and all it stands for.

4. The measures which the United States has taken so far in the Berlin crisis are played up much more in the U.S. papers than they are in German papers. For example, the battle group movement to Berlin, while applauded, was considered as a purely psychological gesture. The Germans are too experienced and realistic in military affairs to think that a battle group makes any real difference in the military balance. The appointment of Clay, on the other hand, was considered as a very good move due to the belief that Clay is a sound but tough man.

5. All of this is leading to a real "crisis of confidence" in Bonn. There is almost a rush in the direction of DeGaulle: Regardless of what he says, he represents a strong figure and a willingness to stand up to Russian pressures. The obverse of this tendency is a fairly rapid turning away from the Anglo-Saxons. The Germans are rather restrained as to the British, probably due to their realization that

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the British are latently anti-German anyway. This, however, results in the U.S. picking up the bulk of the resentment. As an aside, he observed that the British papers were behaving very badly, that they tend to blame the Germans, or anything, for the Berlin crisis, rather than putting the finger on the USSR.

6. There is a strong feeling that Adenauer has been forced by American action or inaction into embracing negotiation. This engenders resentment, whether it is true or not, as no country likes to feel that they are in pawn to another power.

7. Dr. Strausz-Hupe also had a long talk with Straus, the Minister of Defense.

8. Dr. Strausz-Hupe, while feeling that all of these developments were undesirable, avoided making any recommendations or comments. He merely wished to report what he had observed.

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of the President